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T H E international trade in basic or agricultural commodities, and more 
specifically grains and oilseeds, concerns about 22% of the world production 
of wheat and 14.5% of the world production of feed grains.' The deficits of 
the rest of the world are filled by the USA, Canada, the EC, Australia and 
Argentina. The world trade in agricultural commodities is 125 million tons 
which, at an averaged price today of $125 a ton, gives a figure of 15,625 
million dollars. 
For the year 1990-91 the United States alone held about 32% of the 
international wheat trade and about two-thirds of the international trade in 
feed grains. Canada trades about 20% of the international wheat market, 
Australia about 12%, and the EC has kept 20% of international trade in 
wheat. Argentina enjoys 7% of world wheat exports.2 These numbers change 
from year to year according to the size of crops and the rate of competitiveness 
on the world markets. Apart from these five exporting countries, the rest of 
the world has an insufficient production and imports through centralized 
national buying agencies only that which is necessary, in order to protect their 
national production. 
During recent years, the principal importers of wheat were: the Far Eastern 
countries including the People's Republic of China (27 to 30 million tons); 
Japan (5.7 million tons); the former Eastern European countries (2 million 
tons) and the USSR, which has irregular but strongly increasing needs (30 to 
35 million tons for the 1991-1992 period); the African countries and the Near 
East, (more than 30 million tons); and the European Community (of which 
the Member States still import 2 million tons a year).3 
In animal feeding stuffs, the three biggest importers are the USSR (about 
22 million tons), Japan (28 to 29 million tons), and the EC (3.5 million tons).4 
The majority of import-export transactions is done by the big international 
trading companies. Among them, contracts are almost always made on the 
terms of the relevant trade associations' standard forms which 'can run into 
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more than 200 lines of print and are intended to reflect all aspects of how the 
trade in any particular commodities is normally conducted'.5 These Asso-
ciations deal with 'physicals', that is, with the commodities themselves, and 
their contract forms are for physical delivery. By contrast; 
'futures trading concerns what is bought and sold on the futures (or terminal) markets of 
parcels of goods of a specified quantity and quality for delivery in certain specified months 
in the future. Whereas in physical trading all parties are dealing in goods which are expected 
to be delivered, in futures trading most of the traders are buying and selling before the 
delivery dates arrive. However, those dates do arrive and a future can become a physical so 
that the persons who hold bought notes have to take delivery of actual goods. Likewise, those 
who have sold have to produce the goods for those who have bought and want to take 
delivery when the time arrives'.6 
The world's major associations of basic commodity trade are: the Grain 
& Feed Trade Association of London, known under the acronym GAFTA, 
and the London based Federation of Oils, Seeds and Fats Associations 
(FOSFA), which cover over 70% of London commodity arbitration per year; 
LRBA (London Rice Brokers Association);7 A F O A (American Fat and Oils 
Association) of New York; P O R A M (Palm Oil Refiners Association of 
Malaysia); and NAEGA (North American Export Grain Association) 
Washington, DC. 
In Europe, historically, trade associations are the continuations of corpor-
atist organizations. At a very early stage, these associations developed their 
code of practice, general professional conditions and their standard form 
contracts as well as their arbitration institutions in order to settle their 
disputes within their own corporation.8 Their standard contracts are very 
widely used throughout the world by the private sector, but they are rarely 
relied upon by State enterprises, as the latter have their own terms of 
purchase, usually providing for litigation or arbitration in their own country. 
These contract forms are for different commodities, different origins, different 
methods of transportation or different trade terms.9 They contain, inter alia, 
clauses for quality/price allowance allowing a certain percentage of price 
reduction in case of a given deficiency in the specifications; force majeure 
clauses; strike and prohibition clauses; default clauses contemplating resale 
and cover; and, of course, arbitration clauses. 
Besides establishing standard contract forms as well as quality standards for 
their commodities and encouraging uniformity in trade practices, one of the 
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major roles of these trade associations is precisely to organize arbitrations 
under their auspices. A party to an arbitration, whether it be a member or 
not, who does not comply with an award is blacklisted or its name 'posted', 
as it is commonly said, in the trade. This is so in the case of English,10 
German" and Dutch12 trade associations' arbitrations. In France, where the 
commodity trade arbitrations are held under the auspices of an institution 
autonomous from the trade associations - (namely the Chambre Arbitrale of 
Paris, the principal French institutionalized commodities arbitration centre)-
blacklisting is not done by the arbitration institution but by the trade 
association.13 
Under the Grain Arbitration Rules of the AAA, the arbitrators are 
appointed from a standing list. But, in London GAFTA, FOSFA and LRBA 
arbitrations, the arbitration is initiated by the claimant designating an 
arbitrator, and so advising the other party. If the arbitrator declines to serve, 
a substitute may be named; if the other party does not appoint an arbitrator, 
the association may, upon application, do so on its behalf. If the two 
designated arbitrators cannot agree on a third one, the association may make 
the nomination.14 The third arbitrator is Chairman of the Tribunal under the 
rules of GAFTA, and Umpire under the rules of FOSFA. In case of a 
disagreement on the issue, the two party-appointed FOSFA arbitrators 
officially act, from the time of their disagreement, as advocates. The principle 
of the arbitrator/advocate system is recognised in Wessanen's Koninklijke 
Fabrikien v. Isaac Modiano Brother & Sons Ltd.15 But one writer has said:16 
In the commodity trades it was for long accepted that a party who had appointed 'his' 
arbitrator would expect that arbitrator to do his very best for his appointer's case and to 
make an award that would be as favourable as possible to him. There did not seem to be 
anything wrong in this because the other party's arbitrator would be doing his best for his 
appointer and if the arbitrators failed to reach agreement, they would call in an umpire 
before whom each could present his party's case as an advocate. This was widely accepted 
as 'arbitration' although it now seems more like a form of amiable composition at least until 
an umpire is called in. There are several disadvantages in this system. It encourages 
advocacy. It tends to give an advantage to parties who appoint experienced and able 
arbitrators over those who appoint less senior men: this is not only unfair but it tends to 
restrict the spread of experience and to concentrate work in the hands of a small number of 
well-known persons, thus leading to the problem of the 'busy arbitrator ' and resulting delays. 
Furthermore, it can lead to unofficial but commercial and undesirable links between parties 
and arbitrators. 
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In commodity arbitrations a link exists per se as the commodity trade 
arbitrator is - as is the case for experts of any specific field - 'almost 
necessarily colleague with or competitor of one of the parties'.17 
Short and strict time limits are provided for initiating a claim by the 
Arbitration Rules of G A F T A and FOSFA, and failure to do so may result in 
barring the claim, unless the arbitrators exercise their discretionary power to 
extend time. This is one of the very rare situations where GAFTA and 
FOSFA contracts implicitly contemplate equitable considerations. These 
matters of extension of time-limits to claim arbitration, or to prevent a claim 
from lapsing through inaction, are then decided according to the subjective 
moral conscience of the arbitrators, and not according to pre-established rules. 
An arbitrator would commonly look at the sort of reasons that the Court 
would take into consideration (as in the case of section 27 of the Arbitration 
Act 1950) in deciding whether or not he should allow an extension of time to 
initiate a claim. 
Institutionalized commodities arbitrations in Europe are normally two-tier. 
The party dissatisfied with an award may lodge an appeal, which is heard by 
the Board of Appeal, usually comprised of five arbitrators appointed by the 
association. Under Rule 7(a) of the FOSFA Rules of Arbitration and Appeal, 
'the appeal shall be determined by a Board of Appeal of five members, 
appropriately appointed by the Federation from the Arbitration and Appeal 
Panel'.18 In practice, the appointment is made by the Executive Committee. 
In GAFTA, the two persons with the highest number of votes go on the Board 
of Appeal, the three other members being selected from a roster maintained 
for that purpose19 and composed of members elected by the Council after 
passing the prescribed examination.20 On appeal, the case is heard de novo and 
new evidence can be submitted for the first time, provided notice is given to 
the other side in reasonable time before the hearing. 
At the Chambre Arbitrate of Paris, the original award is called 'project of 
award' and becomes a final award after time for appeal has elapsed.21 
At G A F T A and FOSFA appeal hearings, parties are usually represented 
by the arbitrator appointed at the original arbitration. The system has been 
criticized in Continental Europe.22 In France, the Court of Appeal of Rheims 
has held that the fact that an opponent's representative before the GAFTA 
Board of Appeal was the arbitrator appointed by it at the first tier arbitration 
did not constitute a violation of French international public policy.23 Members 
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of the legal profession cannot represent the parties at the original arbitration. 
They can do so only at appeals, if they have obtained leave of the Board of 
Appeal. In-house lawyers of trading companies do not need such leave. If 
subtle points of law are involved and a request is made to the Board for a 
reasoned award with a view to judicial review, it is likely that the application 
for 'legal representation' will be accepted (for example, in case of issues of 
waiver or estoppel). In his recent book Commodity Arbitration Today, Derek 
Kirby-Johnson characterizes the role of lawyers in trade arbitration as 
'interesting',24 as their role is played behind the scenes. 
Typical situations which give rise to commodity arbitration are: formation 
of contract; problems of interpretation, such as a clause on warehousing 
expenses, commonly called 'carrying charges', or on vessel's demurrage or 
extra waiting time at load port for FOB, or at port of discharge for CIF , 
contracts; the meaning and value of documents; force majeure and im-
port/export prohibitions; the ascertaining of the day of the breach so as to 
ascertain the current market or default price on that day; whether or not a 
market existed; problems of price allowances for inferiority in quality or 
misdescription. 
Equitable considerations are often relied upon in commodity arbitrations 
in the United States. In Continental European countries arbitration in equity 
or ex aequo et bono, where arbitrators act as 'amiable compositeur', is an 
institution in itself. However, such an arbitration does not exist in English law, 
where arbitration is subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Courts. But 
does this mean that the British business community rejects arbitration in 
equity as a foreign sociological reality? 
The prominent French jurist Marc Ancel, in an article published in 1961 
under the title of Valeurs actuelles en droit compare,^ said that 'many differences 
in methods and techniques, however important or irreducible they may be, 
are nothing other than particular means through which a common reality 
expresses or tries to express a conception, or at least an analogous conception, 
of fundamental rules of social behaviour'. Considering that the common 
reality here is the need of the business community for equitable considerations 
in arbitration, and the differences between the English and Continental 
European systems of arbitration as to equity, the two systems should have 
their own tools to express their own conception of reality. This is confirmed 
by Eric Loquin, in L 'amiable composition en droit compare et international?6 who 
states that: ' In a hostile legal milieu, a phenomenon of an arbitration freed 
from the strict application of the rules of law has succeeded to manifest and 
impose itself in practice, by different means, certainly, but by producing 
equivalent results to those of arbitration in equity. In practice, British 
Kirby-Johnson, supra, p. 7, n. 19. 
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merchants have, in fact, received from arbitration the same services as their 
Continental equivalents. And arbitration responded to this expectation'. 
Despite a legal environment hostile to equitable considerations in English 
arbitrations, there were two elements which, when combined, allowed trade 
arbitrators a vast area of freedom vis-a-vis the judiciary, and which enabled 
them to decide in fairness and good moral conscience. These were, until the 
English Arbitration Act of 1979, the absence of duty to give reasons, coupled 
with the small percentage (only 2%) of awards subject to what is today 
known as the 'old special case procedure' for the determination of a question 
of law.27 Since that time, the Arbitration Act 1979 contemplates, in Section 
1(3), a limited right of appeal to the High Court on questions of law with 
leave of the Court (or agreement of the parties, which is in fact never given 
by the party who won the arbitration) and obliges the arbitrators to state 
reasons if this is requested by the parties. However, the difficulty in remitting 
the award for the statement of arbitrators' further reasons is such that, 
coupled with the small number of cases which qualify for the leave of the 
Court for a judicial review of the award, this tends to give the arbitrators 
almost the same freedom as before 1979. Also, the Court will not grant leave 
on the question whether there was any evidence on which an arbitrator could 
arrive at a particular finding of fact.28 A Dutch lawyer has commented that 
basically the situation, before and after 1979, has remained the same.29 
Within the framework of this freedom, equitable considerations, when taken 
into consideration, are in practice not reasoned. Trade arbitrators are 
'commercial men',30 experts as to facts, who have a thorough knowledge of 
the standard form contracts and their usages, and who are usually not 
inclined to enter into problems of construction. Hence - and a fortiori - there 
is a reluctance to give reasons in equitable matters since 'the arbitrator in 
equity is an arbitrator adjudicating on the basis of rules of law, but with the 
duty to show particular sensitivity, which may even lead him to go further 
than the law provides. This implies that the reasoning of the arbitrator in 
equity starts in law and develops in the criticism of law'.31 Compared to 
reasoning in equity, legal reasoning has been qualified as 'narrow' by the late 
Professor Rene David.32 
Another reason why equitable considerations are not reasoned in the 
awards is that, as a matter of principle, trade arbitrators, being businessmen, 
do not like to refer explicitly to moral considerations: to take an example, a 
defaulting buyer makes an offer of repurchase at well above the actual market 
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price to an innocent seller who no longer has the goods at a time when goods 
are not available on the market, with a view to reducing the damages payable 
on the ground that the seller should have accepted the offer in mitigation. In 
arriving at the current market value for assessing damages, trade arbitrators' 
reaction would most probably be to disregard, but not to comment on the 
offer made in bad faith. 
One fundamental issue in commodity export contracts where equitable 
considerations are not taken into consideration is that of inspection certificates 
under clauses making them final and conclusive for the determination of the 
conformity of quality or weight. Inserted by merchants with the idea of 
reducing as much as possible disputes on quality or quantity, these clauses are 
held valid. In Toepfer v. Continental Grain Co.,33 US Federal Authorities issued 
a certificate of quality at loadport which did not correspond to the quality of 
the goods actually discharged at destination. Although at a later stage the 
goods were confirmed by US Authorities as being of a lower quality, the 
Court of Appeal upheld the finding of the G A F T A Board of Appeal that the 
original certificate was final and binding irrespective of the accepted mistake 
in the inspection certificate by the surveyor. The rationale behind this decision 
is that, whenever two persons agree to refer a matter to a third person for 
decision and further agree that his decision is to be final and binding upon 
them, then, as long as he arrives at his decision honestly and in good faith, 
the two parties are bound by it. They cannot re-open it for mistake or error 
on his part or for any reason other than fraud or collusion.34 The reason for 
the rigid application of these clauses by trade arbitrators seems to be that they 
are generally inclined to apply the law in the most straightforward manner, 
when as here, it is unambiguous, whereas equitable considerations are taken 
into consideration for cases presenting legal subtleties. 
Similarly, in a G A F T A Arbitration (which became public, as the result of 
judicial review by the Commercial Court) a defaulting seller was required to 
pay damages irrespective of the amount of the performance bond cashed by 
the buyer on the straightforward reasoning that the bond was independent 
from the contract. The decision was overturned by the Court which held that 
on the construction of the default clause credit had to be given for the 
guarantee. 
If under 'certificate final' clauses equitable considerations have not so far 
modified the harshness of the conclusiveness based on the findings of the 
inspection certificate, there are nevertheless situations where this type of 
certificate may not be final and binding: the inspection certificate must be 
obtained without fraud or collusion with the certifier. The certificate must 
also relate to contract goods: in a situation where cargo was inspected but the 
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consignment tested was not the consignment which was eventually shipped 
the 'certificate final' doctrine was held not to apply.36 A further condition for 
the 'certificate final' doctrine to apply is that there must be strict compliance 
of the certificate with the terms of the contract. There is no room for 
inspection certificates which are 'almost the same' as those required by the 
contract. Even if the certificate conclusively complies as to quality, goods may 
be rejected and damages claimed by the buyer, if goods do not meet the 
contractual description.37 
A situation where the decision of trade arbitrators is often based on fairness 
and good conscience, is with respect to awarding damages under sales 
contracts or, in practice, the ascertaining of the current market price on the 
day of default, as provided by almost identical standard default clauses of the 
standard form contracts of trade associations. For example, where six con-
tracts are exhibited as evidence of the price of the goods on a given date, with 
respectively three hypothetical prices at US$100, 1 at 99, 1 at 98, 1 at 95, the 
reaction of a person without knowledge of the trade would be to add the 
figures and divide them by 6. The skilled and experienced arbitrator will 
achieve a more accurate result by selecting a price which is more relevant 
than the others, because he may find some of the prices, for a variety of 
reasons, not representative. His reasons to prefer such a price rather than 
another will be based on his knowledge of the trade and considerations of 
fairness. This is even more true when the price to be ascertained does not 
concern that of a cargo sold on a given date, but the price at which it could 
have been sold. In these cases trade arbitrators do not seek to justify their 
calculations by strict legal rules38 but declare that on the evidence before 
them, the price is such. 
Another situation where equitable considerations are relied upon in com-
modity arbitrations is the case of goods sold in bulk with certain specifications 
(for instance, their protein or fibre content) and which are found mixed with 
other commodities at loading, in a situation where the contract does not 
provide for damages or anything else in case of admixture of goods. (Lack of 
provisions on admixture is not surprising as in overseas sales risk passes from 
the seller to the buyer as from shipment, and admixture normally takes place 
during the sea transit. It thus becomes a matter arising under the bill of lading 
between the receiver, usually a C I F buyer under the contract, and the 
shipowners). To resist a buyer's claim for an allowance because of the 
admixture, the seller may invoke conformity of the goods with the contractual 
specifications and the 'certificate final' doctrine. The buyer's reason for the 
claim is only because the mixed goods he bought are worth less than the 
contract goods: he cannot prove having suffered damages if the goods are not 
Cauwenberghe v. Tropical Products [1986] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 535. 
Sale of Goods Act 1979, S. 13(1). 
Craig Park and Paulsson, International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration (1984), p. 97, quoting ICC Case 
344 of 1981 on the determination of price in oil sales contract. 
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resold to the market for determining their price, and if his own buyers - the 
receivers in the chain of contracts - do not complain, since they usually do 
not analyse the relatively small parcels delivered and accepted by them. 
Despite the buyer's lack of evidence as to damages, these cases are approached 
on a moral basis and the buyers are compensated by a price allowance on the 
unspoken understanding that, from their trade knowledge, arbitrators were 
aware that the admixture was caused not by factors proper to the commodity 
itself or during the sea transit, but because the initial sellers at the country of 
origin deliberately mixed the commodity with another commodity (for 
example soyabean meal and wheat pollards), which they can no longer sell to 
the principal client country in view of recent regulations restricting its 
importation there. 
The measure of damages in such a case is given by section 53(3) of the Sale 
of Goods Act 1979. In case of breach of warranty of quality, the loss is prima 
facie the difference between the value of the goods at the time of delivery and 
the value they would have had if they had fulfilled the warranty. The 
admixed goods are then found rejectable for misdescription (section 30(4)), 
the breach of condition is found to be treated as breach of warranty by the 
buyer who accepted the goods, the certificate of analysis constitutes evidence 
of the lesser value of the goods because of the admixture and, 'as such', is 
judged sufficient for the granting of an allowance to the buyer. 
The system of allowances in case of difficulty in bringing evidence of the 
damage is recognized by English Courts as common practice in the commer-
cial world.39 This relates to a situation where a party did actually suffer 
damage but has difficulty proving it, which is in fact a completely different 
case. But this situation should not be surprising, as equity in the hands of 
arbitrators is different from equity in the hands of judges. In the service of 
law, judges serve morality only to the extent that the former has adopted the 
precepts of the latter.40 The position of the arbitrator is different from that of 
the judge. As a private person holding his powers from two persons, he is not 
- in any case, at least not essentially - at the service of the law. This fact 
allows him to be conscious of the fact that the parties rely on his sense of 
equity in which morality occupies a good part.41 
To illustrate the impact of equitable considerations in commodity arbitra-
tions, it is interesting to note the comment of a past president and arbitrator 
of a leading London trade association: 'What is in fact being said is that a 
large majority of the disputes that do arise raise no points of law and simply 
revolve around what is considered to be a reasonable commercial interpreta-
tion of a particular set of circumstances'42 and the duty of trade arbitrators is 
Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 3rd ed. (1987), p. 486. 
Pierre Mayer 'La Regie morale dans l'arbitrage international' in Etudes offertes a Pierre Bellet (1991), 
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Mayer, op. cit., supra. 
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'to use their commercial experience to adjudicate on the evidence placed 
before them (it goes without saying they must do so according to the law).43 
CONCLUSION 
Although there are restraints on the desire of arbitrators to take equitable 
considerations into account, these restraints being caused mainly by the 
supervisory power of the judiciary and the desire to respect strictly the 
wording of the contract, we have seen that equitable considerations play, in 
the English arbitration system where they are not supposed to exist, an 
important role. This, I believe, provides the answer to the question of whether 
or not every arbitrator is a hidden equitable arbitrator. 
Chapman, op. cit., p. 332, n. 5. 
